Forfeited grants Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company by House of Representatives Report No. 1663, 48th Congress, 1st Session (1884)
48TH CoNGRESS, l HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. 
lst Session. _( {
REPORT 
No.1663. 
FORFEITED GRANTS ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC RAILROAD 
COMPANY. 
MAY 28, 1884.-Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed. 
Mr. CoBB, from the Uommittee on the Public Lands, submitted the 
following 
REPORT: 
[To accompany bill H. R. 7162.] 
The Committee on the Public Lands, to whom were referred sundry bills for 
the forfeitm·e of the land grant to the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad 
Company, submit the following report: 
The grant made to the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company is, 
according to the estimate made by the company, the largest land-grant 
ever made to any corporation in this country, the estimated number of 
acres being 49,244,803-an empire in extent. 
The act making this great grant was approved July 27, 1866. (14 
Stat. at Large, 292.) By this act the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad 
Company was authorized and empowered to lay out and construct a 
continuous railroad and telegraph line, beginning at the town of Spring-
field, in the State of Missouri; thence to the wes·tern boundary-line of 
said State, and thence, by the most eligible railroad route as should be 
determined by said company, to a point on the Canadian River; thence 
to the town of Albuquerque, on the river Del Norte, and thence, by way 
of the Agua Frio, to the headwaters of the Colorado Chiquita; .thence, 
along the thirty-fifth parallel, to the Colorado River, and thence to the 
Pacific Ocean, with a branch diverging at a point where the main line 
strikes the Canadian River, running eastwardly to a point on the west-
ern boundary-line of the State of Arkansas, at the town of Van Buren; 
thus the main line passing through the Inuian Territory, Texas, New 
Mexico, Arizona, and California, a distance of more than 2,000 miles. 
The second section of said act grants to said company the right of 
way over the public lands to the extent of 100 feet on each side of said 
road, and an additional amount of land for depots, &c. 
The third section provides "that there be and hereby is granted" to 
said company, for the purpose of aiding in the construction of its road 
and telegraph line, every alternate section of public land, not mineral, 
designated by odd numbers, to the amount of twenty alternate sections 
per mile on each side of said railroad line through the Territories of the 
United States, and ten alternate sections per mile on each side of said rail-
road whenever it passes through any State. .And in case any lands 
within this limit were disposed of by the Government, the company was 
to have the right to select other lands in lieu thereof in alternate odd-
numbered sections, not more than 10 miles beyond the limits of said 
alternate sections, and not including the reserved numbers. 
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The fourth section of said act provides that whenever said company 
shall have 25 consecutive miles of any portion of said railroad and tele-
graph line ready for the service contemplated, the President of the 
United States shall appoint three commissioners to examine the same, 
and if it shall appear that the same has been completed in a good, sub-
stantial, and workmanlike manner the commissioners shall so report, 
under oath, to the President of the United States, and patents of lands 
shall be issued· to said railroad company confirming to said company 
the right and title to said lands situate opposite to and coterminous 
with said completed section of said road. And the same shall be done 
as often as any 25 consecutive miles are completed. 
The sixth section provides that the President of the United States 
shall cause the lands to be surveyed for 40 miles in width on both sides 
of the entire line of said road, after the general route shall be fixed, and 
as fast as may be required by the construction of said . railroad; and 
that the odd sections of ]and granted shall not be liable to sale or entry 
or pre-emption before or ajte'i' they are surveyed, except by said company, 
as provided by said act. 
The eighth and ninth secti~ns set forth the principal conditions on 
which Raid grant is made. 
The twelfth section provides that the company shall accept the terms 
and conditions of the grant within two years after the passage of the 
act by depositing in the office of the Secretary of the Interior such ac-
ceptance in writing under the corporate seal of said company, duly 
executed pursuant to the direction of its board of directors first had 
and obtained. 
These are the only sections of the act which need be referred to at 
this time for the purposes of this report. Congress passed an act April 
20, 1870, to enable the company to mortgage its road which will be con-
sidered further on. 
The material facts are as follows : 
The company accepted the grant by depositing in the Interior De-
partment its acceptance in writing on the 27th day of November, 1866. 
By the sixth section of said act., as has alre~dy been observed, it is 
provided that the company shall fix the general route of its road, and 
when this was done the President of the United States was to cause 
the lands to be withdrawn. &c. 
A map of the general ro'ute of said road was filed in the Interior De-
partment December 17, 1866, from Springfield, in the State of Missouri, 
to the west line of said State, and the public lands em braced within the 
limits of said grant were withdrawn to the extent or coterminous with 
this part of the located route. 
It is a fact that should be observed, that no further map of the general 
route was filed until December 2, 1871, more than five years after the 
pasRage of the granting act. And the first map of definite location was 
not filed in t,he Interior Department until December 10, 1870, and that 
extended only from Springfield to Neosho, in the State of Missouri, and 
was filed more than four years after the date of the granting act, and 
more than two years after the construction of said road was to have 
been commenced, and after two years of the time had elapsed during 
which it was required by the granting act to complete not less than 50 
miles of its road each year. It is claimed by the company that the 
construction of the road was commenced July 4, 1868. But the affi-
davits of the chief engineer, on file in the Interior Department, show 
that the :first 25 miles of the road was not completed until Septem-
ber 27, 1870, being that portion of the road running west from Spring-
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field, in the State of Missouri. And only 125 miles of the road was com-
pleted within the time fixed for the completion of the whole of the main 
line, leaving unfinished more than 2,000 miles; thus showing that if 
the construction of the road was commenced on July 4, 1868, it was only 
done for ihe purpose of a technical compliance with that condition, as 
no substantial part of the road, as we have already shown, was cqm-
pleted until about September, 1870, thereby proving that the company 
was guilty at the very beginning of two flagrant violations of the con-
ditions of its contract with the Government, in not completing at least 
50 miles each two years after the date when the work was to com-
mence and not having completed the main line within the time fixed. The 
125 miles was not completed until October 14, 1871. InN ovember, 1870, 
this company purchased from the Saint Louis and San Francisco Rail-
way Company the latter's railroad running from a point near Saint 
Louis to Springfield, in the State of Missouri. This was done under the 
pretext of securing an eastern outlet. The price agreed to be paid was 
$10,000,000, which was secured by mortgage on the property so pur-
chased, and that part of the grantee's road together wit~he land grant 
lying in the State of Missouri. A year after this purchase the company 
became so much embarrassed financially that it stopped the further 
construction of its road and afterwards made default in the payment of 
interest on its said mortgage indebtedness. And the said mortgage was 
foreclosed, and afterwards, on September 14,1876, the entire mortgaged 
property waR sold to William F. Buckley, and by him conveyed, Novem. 
ber 2, 1876, to the Saint Louis and 8an Francisco Railway Company .. 
Thus this latter company again became the owner of the property it 
had sold and also that part of the road and land graut belonging to the 
Atlantic and Pacific Company lying in the State of 1\fissouri, leaving 
the latter company the owner of but 34 miles of completed road at the 
date of said sale. And this is the only portion of said road the com-
pany built west of the western line of the State of Missouri. And this 
is operated and controlled by the Saint Louis and San Francisco Rail-
way Company. This latter company built during the last year 65 miles 
of road over the line of the Atlantic and Pacific west from Vinita and 
and is now operating the same. As has been stated the Atlantic and 
Pacific company stopped the construction of its road in the year 1871 
and no more of its road was completed until November, 1882, more than 
eleven years after it had suspended work and more than four years after 
the time when the main line should have been completed by the terms 
of the granting act. And said company was utterly powerless to com-
plete any further portion of its road when the Atchison, Topeka and 
Santa Fe and the Saint Louis and San Francisco Railroad companies 
for the purpose of being able to completely control the Atlantic and 
Pacific Company and its imperial land grant, and to ultimately become 
the owner of all its property, entered into a contract with the latter 
company for the completion of that part of said road from Albuquerque, 
N. Mex., to the Atlantic Ocean, known and designated as the western 
division. This tripartite agreement was entered into January 31, 1880, 
and provided for the immediate completion of the said western division. 
To provide the money necessary for this construction, early in 1880, 
a first mortgage, to secure an issue of bonds not exceeding $25,000 per 
mile, was placed upon the entire railroad, franchise, and land grant of 
the Western Division; and an income mortgage to secure an issue of 
income bonds, not exceeding $18,750 per mile upon this division, was 
also executed. Should the net earnings of the Western Division prove 
insufficient to meet the interest upon those first-mortgage uonds, the 
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Saint Louis and San Francisco Railway Company and the Atchison, 
Topeka, and Santa Fe Bailroad Company have guaranteed the same to 
the extent of 25 per cent. of their gross earnings upon all business in-
terchanged by them respectively with the said Western Division. 
In -April, 1880, $10,000,000 of the first-mortgage bonds and $7,500,000 
of the income bonds of this division were sold by subseription at par 
for the first ·mOl tgage bonds to parties holding nghts under the agree-
ment. A second subscription of $15,000,000 firsts and $11,250,000 in-
comes of the Western Division was offered the same parties by circular 
dated January 20, 1882, and promptly subscribed in full; but before 
allotment all subscriptions were reduced by the board of directors Feb-
ruary 2S, 1882, to40percent. of theoriginalamount-thatis, to$6,000,000 
:firsts and $4,500,000 incomes, in accordance with the right reserved by 
the terms of the Rubscription. 
Should the net proceeds of these subscriptions prove to be insufficient 
to complete the road, andpaythe interest upon the first-mortgage bonds 
during construction, arrangements have been made with the Atchison, 
Topeka and S~nta Fe Railroad Company and the Saint Louis and San 
Francisco Railway Company, which own neaJ;ly all the capital stock of 
this company, to advance any deficit, share and share alike, in the form 
of a loan, to be repaid hereafter. 
And a first mortgage was also executed on the 1st day of March, 1882, 
on that portion of the road between the west line of the State of Mis-
souri, near Seneca, to the town of Albuquerque on the Rio Grande River, 
in the Territory of New Mexico, called the Central Division, to secure 
the payment of bonds to the amount of $25,000 per mile for that part 
of the road. 
These bonds were all taken, and are now owned by the parties inter-
ested in the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe and the Saint Louis and 
San Francisco companies, and the capital stock is now owned by these 
two companies; and the Atlantic and Pacific Road, and all the prop-
erty, rights, and franchises of the company, are virtually owned and con-
trolled by these two corporations. They hold the mortgage interests 
complete, all of the road which is completed, and operate it after it is so 
completed. vVe believe that the tripartite agreement above referred to 
was entered into with a full understanding by all the parties that the 
.Atlantic and Pacific was to maintain a nominal existence merely so as 
to enable these two corporations to secure the benefit of the land grant 
to the extent they desire under the act passed by Uongress April 21, 
1871, to enable the Atlantic and Pacific Company to mortgage its road. 
They caused the murtgages named to be executed, and the bonds to be 
issued, for the individuals composing these two companies owned the 
capital stock of the .Atlantic and Pacific Company, thus giving them 
complete control of t.he latter company. They bought the bonds so 
issued, and now own them, and these corporations guaranteed their pay-
ment. They are, therefore, both debtor and creditor in this transaction . 
.And they are now only completing such parts of said road as suits their 
selfish desires, in securing such parts of the land grant as may be co-
terminous therewith at the date of the declaration of forfeiture by the 
Government. Since entering into this tripartite agreement they have 
completed 559 miles of the Western Division, extending west from Isleta 
Junction on the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad to the Colo-
rado River, near the Needles. .At this latter point connection is formed 
with the Southern Pacific Railroad, and running arrangements have 
been entered into with the latter road, extending to the city of San 
Francisco. Whether the road will ever be completed west of its present 
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terminus we do not know. But we do know that the lands have been 
withdrawn for more than fourteen years from homestead pre-emption 
and entry the whole length of the road, and even beyond what was 
contemplated by the granting act. The act required the company to 
construct its road on the most practicable and eligible route along the 
thirty-fifth parallel of north latitude to the Pacific Ocean. This fixed 
the western terminus of the road, as we believe, at or near the point 
where the thirty-fifth parallel intersects the Pacific Ocean. But im,tead 
of filing its map of definite location, in accord with this, when it crossed 
the east line of the State of California, it left the t,hirty-fifth parallel and 
passed up the Pacific coast, and terminated the location near the thirty-
eighth parallel of north latitude at the city of San Francisco; and 
strange as it may seem to some, the Assistant Attorney-General of the 
United States, W. H. Smith, sustained the right of the company to do 
so in a written opinion delivered March 16, 187 4, which was confirmed 
by the then Secretary of the Interior, C. Delano . . Secretary Cox, a 
former Secretary, denied the company thi~:_; right in a written opinion to 
the Commissioner of the General Land Office, delivered on November 
11, 1869. He said: 
I cannot recognize the claim of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company to a reser-
vation of lands npon the route in question. The act already cited (July 27, 1866), 
npon which they rely, does not, as I construe it, make them a grant of lands from the 
point at which the road shall strike tho Colorado River to San Francisco. 
We concur in the opinion of Secretary Cox. He is a gentleman of 
high legal attainmentH, and was au honest and faithful officer. But his 
opinion was overruled, as we have shown, and a vast area of public land 
was added to this already magnificent grant. The amount of land with-
drawn in the State of OaJifornia, on account of this grant amounts to 
6,855,040 acres, embracing some of the most valuable lands in the State. 
And a sumrnarv of these facts shows: 
1st. That the Atlantic and Pacific Company never completed but 34 
miles of the road which it now claims to own. 
2d. That at the time when the main line should have been. completed 
(July 4, 187.,), there was uncompleted 2,267 miles of that line. 
3d. That said company at no time since its creation has been, and is 
not now, able to complete the road. 
4th. That the stockholders of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe 
and the Saint Louis and San Francisco Railroad companies own most 
of its capital stock. 
5th. That these corporations caused the mortgages to be executed on 
the franchises, rights, and property, including the land grant, and caused 
the bonds to be issued and guaranteed their payment, and took the bonds 
when so issued and now hold them. 
6th. That they virtually own and control t,he Atlantic and Pacific 
Company and all its property, together with its mortgage and bonded 
indebtedness; and are holding them and allowing the company to 
maintain a mere nominal existence. 
We have now given a brief history of the facts connected with this 
grant fro~ its beginning to the present time, passing over a period of 
nearly eighteen years and extending nearly eight yea1·s beyond the time 
when the main line should have been completed to enable them to con-
trol the land grant at pleasure under their construction of the law. 
The rules of' law governing this grant are similar to those governing 
other grants heretofore reported by your committee. 
The granting act in its main features is almost an exact copy of the 
act making the grant to the N ortbern Pacific Company, and what we 
said in that case is also applicable in this. 
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The third section of the act contains the following language: 
That there be, and hereby is, granted to the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Com· 
pany * * * every alternate section of public lands not mineral designated by odd 
numbers, &c. 
The eighth and ninth sections read as follows : 
SEC. 8. And be it ju1·ther enacted, That each and every grant, right, and privilege 
herein are so made and given to and accepted by said Atlantic and Pacific Railroad 
Company, upon and subject to the followmg conditions, namely: That the said com-
pany shall commence the work on said road within two years from the approval of 
this act by the President, and shall complete not less than fi.ft.y miles per year after 
the second year, and shall construct, equip, furnish, and complete the main line of 
the whole road by the fourth day of July, anno Domini eighteen hundred and seventy-
eight. 
SEC. 9. And be it ju1·ther enacted, That the United States make the several condi-
tional grants herein, and that the said Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company accept 
the same, upon the further condition that if the said company make any breach of the 
conditions hereof, and allow the same to continue for upwards of one year, then, in 
such case, at any time hereafter, the United States may do any and all acts and things 
which may be needful and necessary to insure a speedy completion of the said road. 
Whatever may have been the earlier rulings upon the subject, it is 
clear that under the third, eighth, and ninth sections just quoted the 
.Atlantic and Pacific Company took at the date of the act an estate in 
presenti upon conditions subsequent. (Rutherford vs. Green's heirs, 2 
Wheat; Louissen vs. Price, 12 Howard, 59; Schulenberg vs. Harriman, 21 
Wall., 149;. VanWyck vs. Knevals, 16 Otto; Opinion of Attorney-Gen-
eral Devens, 16; Opinion .Attorney-General Brewster, Ex. Doc. 31, 1st 
sess. 48th Congress; Leavenworth, &c., R. R. Co. vs. U. S., 92 U.S. 
Reports, 7 41.) 
This being a grant in presenti, vesting the title of the lands described 
in the grant in the company as we have shown, the question arises 
bow that title can be divested. In the case of Schulenberg vs. Harriman, 
above cited, it is held that it requires an act of Congress declaring a 
forfeiture in order to divest the company of the title. .As the law now 
stands Congress must take the initiative by either declaring a forfeiture 
by direct enactment to that effect, or it must pass a law conferring juris-
diction on the courts. In other words, it seems that under the opinion 
in the case of Schulenberg vs. Harriman, that Congress has the exclusive 
jurisdiction to declare a forfeiture. It is held in the case of Farnsworth 
vs. Minnesota and Pacific Ra,ilroad Company, 92 U. S., page 66, that-
A forfeiture by the State of an interest in lands and connected franchises, granted 
for the construction of a public work, may be declared for non-compliance with the 
conditions annexed to their grant or their possession, when forfeiture is provided by 
statute, without judicial proceedings to ascertain and determine the failure of the 
grantee to perform the conditions. 
Confirming the rule laid down in the above-cited cases. 
Your committee have uniformly held that Congress possesses the 
power to declare these grants forfeited. and have reported several bills 
for that purpose, two of which have already passed the House. And 
we may state, also, that of all the learned counsel who have appeared 
before us none of them have taken issue with the law as we have just 
stated it. They all agree that Congress has jurisdiction to declare a 
forfeiture in all such cases. 
The question rests upon a construction of sections 3, 8, and 9. The 
.attorneys for the company claim that they constitute an absolute dedi-
cation of the lands to the purpose of construction and maintenance of 
the road. They contend that there is no condition subsequent what-
.ever, and that the only power in the United States is the power through 
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Congress to adopt such measures as may be necessary to insure ~ 
.speedy completion of the road in case the company fails to build it. 
The third, fifth, eighth, and ninth sections of the act we are here con-
sidering are in substance the same as the like numbered sections in the 
Northern Pacific grant; and what your committee said in the report 
made by J ndge Henley to the House at the present session in that case 
ris equally applicable in this, therefore we adopt it, as follows: 
On the other hand, your committee regard this construction as utterly untenable, 
~nd are clearly of the opinion-
!. That section 8 of the act declares a condition subsequent, viz, that the road shall 
be completed within a certain time, upon hreach of which the grantor may declare a 
forfeiture. · 
2. That section 9 is in no way repugnant to section 8, but while embracing all that 
1s included therein, and to that extent perhaps cumulative, is also, in connection with 
-section 5, a declaration of further and additional conditions subsequent, for breach of 
which Congress may interfere to protect the rights of the United States. 
3. Tha.t under either of said sections, or both to(J'ether, the United States, by Con-
gress, has the rtght to declare t.he grant forfeited fur failure to build the road within 
the limitation. 
I. 
Section 8 is perfectly plain in the language used and the purpose contemplated. It 
-declares in so many words that the grant made is given by the United States and ac-
·cepted by the company "subject to the following conditions, namely, that the said com-
pany * * * shall construct, equip, furnish, and complete the whole road," &c. 
Yfhis is too plain for any construction. Congress intended to provide, and did pro-
vide, that the road should be completed within a certain time, and that that should be a 
.condition of the grant. If a condition, the grant is determinable upon its breach, at 
the option of the grantor. 
The argument of the company rests upon the absence of express works declaring 
.a reversion iu case of the breach. That, in the judgment of your committee, was en-
tirely unnecessary in order to create an estate upon condition subsequent. The estate, 
'SO conditioned, is created by declaring the condition, not by declaring the result of its 
breach. The latter, re-entry or its equivalent, follows as matter of legal effect. Every 
lawyer knows the result of a breach of condition subsequent, and the statement of 
that result in any grant adds nothing to the previous description of the estate created. 
The laud does "revert" by operation of law upon the breach being enforced by re-
-entry or its equivalent ; but the right to that re-entry depends upon no express provis-
ion that the laud shall revert. It stands upon the condition declared and its breach. 
Upon this point we quote from the report of the Public Lands Committee, made at 
this session of Congress upon the bill forfeiting the Texas Pacific land grant, reported 
to the House by Judge Payson : 
"In other words, generally stated, the distinguished counsel for the company de-
clares that in law the power to declare a forfeiture of a grant made on condition sub-
:sequent for breach of the condition must be reserved to the grantor by express terms 
in the act making the grant, or it does not exist. 
"No authority was produced to the committee except the statement of the attorneys 
.asserting this extraordinary doctrine in support of it; but the interests being so great, 
we have examined the books on the question, and are not able to find a single author-
ity iu support of the proposition, and we believe none can be found. 
''On the contrary, Washburn on Real Property, vol. 2, 3d ed., p. 15, asserts the rule 
to be, "Where the condition of a grant is express there is no need of reserving a right 
<>f entry for a breach thereof in order to enable the grantor to avail himself of it." 
.(See also Jackson vs. Allen, :3 Cowan, 220; Gray t•s. Blanchard, 8 Pick., 284; Littleton, 
sec. 311.) 
"Indeed, all the decided cases we can find, as well as the text-books, are in harmony 
and to the same effect; so we do not present argument upon it here." 
The estate is created by proper words of description declaring the condition, and 
the legal effect of what follows the breach is exactly the same whether it be described 
J.n the grant or not. Thus in the case under consideration the estate upon condition 
is created by the specific language used. The legal effect of reversion follows the 
breach and declaration of forfeiture. No provision that the land should revert was 
necessary, and if added would simply have described the legal result of what pre-
.ceded it. 
The Touchstone, page 122, thus describes the operative words creating an estate 
<>n condition: 
"Conditions annexecl to estates are sometimes so placed and confounded among 
.covenants, sometimes so ambiguously drawn, and at all times have in their drawing· 
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so much affinity with limitations, that it is hard to discern and distinguish them. 
}{pow therefore, for the most part, conditions have conditional words in their frontis-
piece, and do begin therewith, and that among these words there are three words that 
are most proper, which in their own nature and efficacy, without any addit-ion of other 
wo1·ds of re-entry in the conclltsion of the condition, do make the estate conditional, as. 
p1·oviso, ita quod, and sub conditione." 
Washburn in his work on Real Property, marginal page 445, says: 
''Among the forms of expression, which imply a condition in a grant, the writers 
give the following: 'On condition,'' provided always,' 'if it shall so happen,' or, 'so 
that the grantee pay, &c., within a specified time,' and grants made upon any of 
these terms vest a conditional estate in the grantee." 
When the condition of a gra.nt is express, there is no necessity of reserving a right 
of entry for breach of the condition, in order to enable the grantor to take advantage-
of lt. (Jackson vs. Allen, 3 Cow., ~20; Gray vs. Blanchard, 8 Pick., 21:!4.) 
That the words "upon condition," and even words less specifically expressing the-
intent, are construed as establishing an estate upon condition subsequent, without 
further description, is shown by many authorities. (Littleton, pp. 328, 329, 330, Com. 
Dig. CondWon A 2; 2 Wood, Com. Powell's ed., 505, 512, et seq. j Wheeler vs. Walker,. 
2 Conn., 201; Thomas V8. Record, 477 Me., 500; Sharon Iron Co. vs. Erin, 41 Penn. 
St., 341; Ta~7lor vs. Cedar Rapid R. R. Co., 25 Iowa, 371; Attorney-General VB. Merri-
mack Co., 14 Gray, 612; Tiadley vB. Hadley, 4 Gra.y, 145; Rawsol}. VB. School District, 
7 Allen, 128; Caw vs. Robertson, 1 Selden, 125; Pickle VB. McKissick, 21 Penn. St.,. 
232; Hooper vs. Cummings, 45 Me., 359; Chapin vs. School, 35 N.H., 450; Wiggin VB. 
Berry, 2 Foster, 114; Hayden vs. Stoughton, 5 Pick., 534; Wright vs. Tuttle, 4 Day,. 
326.) 
Authorities upon this point might be multiplied. It is the construction of princi-
ple and authority, and your committee have been referreu to no case which in their 
judgment militates at all against the positjon here assumed. The Touchstone, at 
page 122, immediately followin~ the quotation which we have made, is suggested as 
modifying the authority of the citation in its applicabilit,y to the case under con-
sideration. But no such effect can possibly be given the language used. After stat-
ing the broad proposition quoted, the writer proceeds to say that although the words 
mentioned are "the most proper words to make conditions," yet that they are some-
times used for other purposes. He then points out instances where the word'' p1·oviBo '' 
in certain particular relations may be given a different meaning. But the entire dis-
cussion is limited to that particular word-does not once mention the words ''Bubo 
conditione," or name a single instance where they are nserl in a sense contrary to the 
general rule, aud even in respect to the word '' p1·oviBo" the exception could not 
apply to the case under consideration, for it is expressly limited to a use of the word 
where it does not stand "originally, by and of itself." 
The other authorities to which we have been referred are not in any sense repug-
nant, to the view of the law we adopt. They are few in numbers, and at the best 
simply bold that these apt words may, in certain instances, be restricted by imme-
diate reference to other portions of the deed clearly expressing a different intent in 
the grantor. 'l'bat this is true is not denied; but it does not change the general rule, 
and its applicability to the case under consideration will more properly be noticed 
hereafter. 
We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that section o of the act, by the express 
language used, created an estate upon condition subsequent, forfeitable upon breach 
of the condition. 
II. 
Section 9 of the act, while perhaps embracing the preceding section within its pro-
visions, and possibly to that extent cumulative, is also a provision prescribing cer-
tain other and additional conditions subiequent. 
It will be noticed at the. outset that by its specific language it embraces mort\ than 
one grant, the exact words being "the sereral conditioned g1·ants herein" and that it re-
lates to a" further" condition. The ''further" condition was that if the company 
should make any breach of" the conditions hereof" and the same should continue for 
a year, then the United States might, &c. Now, it is obvious upon the mere reading 
that this language does not primarily relate to section 8, for that section only apper-
tains to one grant, needs no "further" condition, and the provision that the default. 
should continue for a year or upwards would have no pertinence. This section evi-
dently relates t.o some other condition or conditions than that mentioned in sec-
tion 8. 
These other conditions or requirements are found 'in section 5, which provides that 
six separate and distinct things should be done by the company, viz : 1st, that the-
road should be constructed in a substantial and workmanlike manner, equal in all 
respects to first-class railroad; 2d, that it should be made of rails of the best quality,. 
manufactured from American iron; 3d, that a uniform gauge should be established 
·.., 
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throughoui! the entire line; 4th, that the company should construct a telegraph line 
of the most approved and substantial description; 5th, that it should not charge the 
Government higher rates than individuals; and 6th, that it should permit other rail-
roads to make runmng connections on fair and reasonable terms. These are the other 
and further conditions mentioned by section 9, in default of any of which, continuing 
for a year, Congress should have the right to "do any and all acts and things" to 
secure the "speedy completion of the said road," as contemplated and provided. 
The intent of Congress, expressed with abundant precision in the act itself, and, as 
every one knows, as a matter of history, was to insure the construction, within the 
time prescribed, of a substantial, first-class, and thoroughly equipped railroad from 
Lake Superior to the Pacific, suitable and available in all emergencies for use by the 
United States-in peace for the transmission of its mails; in war for the carrying of 
troops and supplies. Congress did not donate 48,000,000 acres of the public domain 
to this company without expecting and requiring some equivalent. Among the 
things it did require was the construction of a first-class road for the purposes and in 
the manner indicated. It accordingly prescribed the various requirements above re-
cited, and to insure obedience to its mandates it provided by section 9 that in default 
of any of the same Congress might do anything necessary to complete the road in the 
manner contemplated and prescribed. The enactment of these provisions would have 
been futile had no reservation been made of a right to enforce them. Without such 
a reservation the Government, upon default of the company, would have had nothing 
left except a claim against the company for breach of contract or of covenant. To 
prevent such a condition of affairs the right was reserved to further legislate to com-
pel obedience to its mandates. These requirements then became additional condi-
tions subsequent, which Congress could enforce by forfeiture or by any other remedy 
deemed appropriate and adequate. That was the object, scope, and intent of section 
9, and it is expressed in unambiguous phrase. 
It is no answer to this proposition to say t.hat these requirements might be enforced 
by the general forfeiture provided by section 8. 
The road might have been built within the time limited and yet every one of these 
conditions been broken. The grant conld not then have been forfeited at all under 
section 8. A road would have been completed, and though built iu absolute disre-
gard of all the requirements of section 5, the Government would have been powerless 
either to resume the grant or compel the company to perform the condition. That 
section 9 relates to other conditions than that mentioned in section 8 is also apparent 
from the use of the words "and allow the same to continue for upwards of one year." 
These words, if applied to the conditions mentioned in section 5, mean something. If 
applied to section 8 they are nonsensical. If Congress had intended to extend the 
period mentioned in section 8 one year, it would have said July 4, 1877; not July 4, 
1876, and another year thereafter. 
It is thus apparent that section 9 of the act has a scope and effect far beyond any:-
thing embraced by section 8; that it legislated upon further and additional subjects; 
has a separate and distinct function of its own, and that instead of limiting or con-
trolling the preceding section it creates additional obligations and liability on the 
part of the company. 
The only answer to this position advanced by the company is the suggestion that if 
this be true then the two sections are utterly inconsistent with each other. It is dif-
ficult to understand how this can be seriously urged. We have already shown a dif- -
ferent legal scope and operation for each under the construction we have adopted. 
'l'hey are not repugnant or inconsistent in the slightest degree. Each stands for its own 
particular purpose. On the other hand, the construction contended for by the com-
pany would violate well-established rules of construction simply to disregard the 
plainly expressed intent of Congress. They claim that the two sections should be 
taken together, and that so taken all that Congress could do upon failure of the com-
pany to build the road would be to take all necessary steps to compel its completion 
without power to forfeit the grant. 
This position is untenable under the rules of construction because, first, it assumes 
an ambiguity, and then to reconcile it rejects the usual and ordinary signification of 
terms and phrases; twice reads as singular a word in the plural, and construes ''further 
condition" as if the word'' further" was omitted; second, with reference to a simple 
time condition, viz, that the road should be built by July 4, 1876, it adds the senseless 
expression, "provided the same shall continue unbuilt one year"; third, it excludes all 
of section 3 from itA relations and connections with section 9 and either rejects it en-
tirely or make3 it practically inoperative; fourth, it violates the manifest general 
intent of the entire act and the general policy of Congress prevailing at the time in 
respect to these grants. 
Another consideration is to be noticed. The provision of section 9 is permissive 
or directory only. Congress may do all necessary things, &c. It is not mandatory 
as it would have been if intended as the sole remedy for the breach of the condition 
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of section 8. So too His not exclusive of other remedies for the breach. Congress 
may in that way enforce the forfeiture or may do it otherwise. 
We have been referred to some authorities which are supposed to sustain the forced 
construction of the act contended for, but after the most careful examination of 
them we are unable to recognize any doctrine contrary to that we have adopted 
for our guidance. The strongest cited are undoubtedly the cases of the Episcopal 
Mission vB. Appleton etal. (17 Mass., 326), and Stanley VB. Colt (5 Wall., 119). They 
do not establish any new doctrine or any principle repugnant to the authority of the 
l()ng line of cases we have cited. 
In the former, the supreme court of Massachusetts, speaking of a voluntary deed 
for charitable purposes, say: 
''Although the words 'upon condition' in a conveyance of real estate are apt words 
to create a condition, any breach of which will forfeit the estate, yet they are not to 
be allowed that effect when the intention of the grantor, as manifested by the whole 
deed, is otherwise." 
And in the latter, the Supreme Court of the United States, speaking of a devise for 
certain charitable purposes, say: 
"It is true the word 'proviso' is an appropriate one to constitute a common-law con-
dition in a deed or will; but this is not t.he fixed and invariable meaning attached to 
it by the law in these instruments. On the contrary, it gives way to the intent of the 
parties as gathered from an examination of the whole instrument," &c. 
The principle announced by these decisions is simply the universal rule of construc-
tion giving effect to the real intent of the parties to an instrument when the same can 
be fairly ascertained from the language used. In other words, that technical expres-
sions and phrases ordinarily yield to a contrary plainly expressed intent. But the 
principle has no applicability to the case under consideration, for there is no intent, 
either expressed or to be reasonably implied, contrary to the technical meaning of the 
words, "upon condition." On the contrary, the act from be~inning to end displays 
in every line a most deliberate, well considered, and matured mtention not to bestow 
this princely gift without AO circumscribing and limiting the company by these con-
ditions as to secure the object, and every object, which Congress had in view. It 
shows the clearest intention in the mind of Congress to create a condition subsequent 
forfeiting the grant for failure to build the road within the prescribed period; and 
also other conditions subsequent, putting it in the power of Congress, even after the 
road had been built, to enforce the requirements of the act touching the manner of 
its construction. In the judgment of your committee, there- is not a word in the act 
indicative of an intent to limit or curtail the technical words of condition used. 
And aside from the language of the act itself, it is incredible that CongresR could 
have intended, in this probably the largest and most valuable grant of lands ever 
made to a railroad company or a State, to depart from the uniform and uninter-
rupted policy of legislation for years, and allow the company to appropria,te this vast 
belt of the public domain without restriction, reservation, or control. Your commit-
tee cannot subscribe to such a doctrine and can find no argument, even plausible, to 
support it. We are clearly of opinion that Congress intended to provide for a forfeit-
ure upon failure to build the road within the prescribed period, and that the language 
used was abundantly sufficient in law to accomplish that intent. 
III. 
Your committee are also well satisfied that even under section 9 of the act, in the 
sense in which it is construed by the company, Congress had and has the power to 
declare a forfeiture. It is conceded that under it ·Congress can do any and all acts 
and things needful and necessary to insure a speedy completion of the road. Congress 
is the sole and exclusive judge of whether the road has at any time, in point of fact, 
been completed; and if not, what remedy should be applied. The remedy of forfeiture 
is included within the general power reserved. The road is in fact uncompleted to 
this day. Congress can now, by virtue of that very reservation, so strenuously in-
sisted upon by the company as protecting the grant, declare the same forfeited and 
restored to the public domain. Might not the forfeiture of the grant in the hands of 
this company and the consequent creation of an open field for equal competition best 
conduce to the speedy ultimate completion of the entire line' If Congress so view 
the matter, there can be no doubt of its power to declare the forfeiture under the 
very clause of the act relied upon by the company for its protection. 
OTHER OBJECTIONS URGED .AGAINST THE FORFEITURE CONSIDERED. 
The granting act was silent upon the authority of the company to 
mortgage its grant. And it is insisted that doubts were entertained 
among capitalists as to whether the company could make a mortgage 
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without this authority was expressed by Congress, and this greatly em-
barrassed and prevented the utilization of the grant to raise money for 
the construction of the road. Hence, the company urged Congress to 
pass an act on April20, 1871 (Stat., vol. 17, p. 19) granting express au-
thority to the company to so mortgage. And after asking and getting 
this act passed, which was said to be so necessary to aid the company 
in raising money to build the road, it is now insisted that it presents an 
additional reason that it was intended by Congress to create a trust 
fund to build this road with conditions that if the company did not ap-
ply the fund to the prescribed use within a specified time, or if the 
mortgagees of the said company did not so apply the same within an-
other specified time that then the Government might take any and all 
steps to secure its intended application, so far as it had not previously 
been applied. 
This is a strange construction to be placed upon the act. Not a single 
authority is cited by the able coun~el for the company in support of it; 
and we venture to assert none can be found in any respectable law 
book in the land. No trust is created, either express or implied, in the 
act; no trustee is named or provided for, for none exists, and we will not, 
therefore, waste time in producing argument and citing authorities 
against this misconstruction. 
After giving the express right to mortgage, the act of April20, 1871, 
above referred to, contains the following proviso: 
Provided, That if the company shall hereafter suffer any breach of the conditions 
of the act above referred to, under which it is organized, the rights of those claiming 
under any mortgage made by the company to the lands sranted to it by said act shall 
extend only to so much thereof as shall be coterminous w1th or appertain to that part 
of said road which shall have been constructed at the time of the fOJ·ecloBure of Baid 
mortgage. 
The attorneys for the trustees of the bondholders under the first 
mortgage made by the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad ·Company assume: 
1st. That· this proviso is equivalent to a declaration that on default 
made by the company in complying with any of the conditions of the 
grant, the mortgagees should have the right to all the lands embraced 
in the grant which were coterminous with the completed road at the 
time of foreclosure. 
If this construction is the correct one, and, as we have shown, the 
mortgageors and mortgagees are the Saint Louis and San Francisco and 
the Atchison, Topeka aud Santa Fe Hailroad Uompanies, and that these 
two companies have constructed and are operating and controlling all 
the road which bas been completed (except the 34 miles), then they 
have complete control of the grant. They can hold it for a hundred 
years without completing another mile of the road, and the Government 
can do nothing, no matter how many breaches of the contract may be 
committed. 
We do not agree with the learned counsel in this construction of the 
proviso. If they are correct why should Congress say "that if the 
company suffer any breach of the conditions of the act" under which it 
was organized the rights of those claiming under al,!y mortgage made 
by the company should extend only to the lands coterminous with com-
pleted road¥ Why not have said that the right of those claiming under 
any mortgage made by the company to the lands granted to it by said 
act shall extend only to so much thereof as is coterminous with the com-
pleted road at the time of the foreclosure of said mortgage¥ 
If .this language had been used and none other the construction con-
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tended for would be correct. But this language was substantially used 
and also the other language set forth in the proviso, which destroys the 
construction placed upon it by the attorneys of the mortgagees; and 
which, in the opinion of your committee, clearly shows that it was the 
legislative intent to limit the rights of the mortgagees to the lands coter-
minous with the completed road at the date of the breach of conditions 
set forth in the original act, and not at the date of the foreclosure of 
the mortgage. This we think is the clear legal expression of the act . 
.Any other construction would destroy the effect of one-half of the lan-
guage in the proviso by treating it as surplusage. This cannot be done 
here without violating the rules of construction and thereby doing great 
injustice to the Government. 
If the constrilction thus placed upon this proviso be correct Congress 
bas the right to forfeit all the lands gra,nted without regard to the 
mortgage, for it was executed after breach of the conditions subsequent 
had occurred. The mortgagPes acquired no rights ut~der the mortgage 
which could preYent Congress from declaring a forfeiture. They knew 
of the breach and took their chances. 
But it is further insisted that this act of Congress last referred to 
authorized the company to execute a mortgage on its property and 
franchisPs, and issue bonds, and is therefore in the nature of a waiver 
or bar to the power of Congress to do any act by which the interests of 
the mortgagees may be affected detrimentally. 
This position is not tenable. Congress, by the passage of said act, 
did not authorize the company to mortg-age the unconditional fee; 
but, upon the contrary, expTessly reserved all the conditions expressed 
in the original act. The compauy did not own the unconditional fee 
in the lands granted. It owned the fee charged with the conditions 
subsequent, and it could mortgage and the mortgagees could only 
take under the mortgage such estate as the company owned at the 
time the mortgage was executed. 
The mortgagees must be held to have known that they were taking 
an estate which was defeasible upon condition broken. They stand in 
the place of the mortgageor. There being a breach of the conditions 
subsequent by the failure of the company to complete its road within 
the time fixed by the grant the mortgagees must take whatever conse-
quences a forfeiture imposes, which is the loss of the defeasible estate 
in so much of the lands granted by the third section of the granting 
act as the bill accompanying this report provides for. They will still re-
tain if the bill passes their lien on the right of way, &c., granted by the 
second section of said act. 
That we are right in these conclusions we think the authorities abun-
dantly show. In Kent (vol. 4, p. 125) the rule is laid down as follows: 
Persons who have an estate or freehold subject to a condition are seized and may 
convey, though the estate will continue defeasible until the condition be performed 
or released, or is barred by the statute of limitation, or by estoppel. 
Greenleaf's Cruise on Real Property (vol. 2, pp. 44, 52) thus lays 
down the doctrine: 
Where a person enters for a condition broken the estate becomes void ab initio; the 
person who enters is again seized of his original estate in the same 'manner as ~f he had never 
conveyed it away. And as the entry of the feoffer on the feoffee for a condition broken 
defeats the estate to which the condition was annexed, so it defeats all rights and inci-
dents annexed to that estate, together with all charges and encumbrances created by the feoffee 
during his possession; for upon the entry of the fooffer he beoonl.es seized of an e1fate para-
mount to that which was subject to these charges. 
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Washburn on Real Property is to the same effect (vol. 2, p. 11, [mar-
ginal page 45]): 
When such entry had been made the effect was to reduce the estate to the same 
plight, and to cause it to be held in the same terms as if the estate to which the con-
dition was annexed had not been granted. 
QUESTION OF TIME MORE FULLY CONSIDERED. 
Tbe time within which a condition subsequent is to be performed is, 
in tllis case, as mncll the essence of tlle coutract as any other part or re-
quirement of the condition. Not even equity will relieve against failure 
to perform witllin the time allowe(l a condition subsequent. Especially 
is this so when the time for the performance of tlle condition is fixed 
by statute, as in this case. (In Farnesworth vs. M. and P. R. R. Co., 2 
Otto, 49; 2 Story, Equity Juris., 103; 26 Willard's Equity Juris., 1324; 
3 Washburn on Real Property, 17, m. p. 455.) Nor where parties have 
fixed the time of performing the contract, unless sometimes in case of 
sale of laud for money and damages for delay is mere matter of compu-
tation of interest. (Boardman vs. Imrick, 10 Cal., 96; 2 White & 
Tudor's Leading Oases in Eq ., 1105; 2 Jones on Mortgages, 1185; 2 Wash-
burn on Real Property, 17.) The grant being oue in presenti with con-
dition subsequent, on failure to perform the condition within the time 
stipulated the right to declare a forfeiture became perfect. A condi-
tion not performed within the specified time when time is a part of the 
condition can never be performed. 
A railroad to be built by the 4th day of July, 1878, cannot after 
that date be built within that time. 
Time in this case was of the essence of the condition: 
(1.) Because it was expressly stipulated; 
(2.) Because it was fixed by statute; 
(3.) Because the value of the land would increase by lapse of time; and, 
(4.) Because the object of the grant was to promote the early devel-
opment of an unsettled portion of the country. Any one of these is 
sufficient to make time the essence of the conditions subsequent. (See 
Pumroy on Contracts, sees. 383, 384, 385, 386.) 
The withdrawal of a large body of land, amounting to many millions 
of acres, from market and settlement without the building of the road, 
retards, instead of promotes, the development of the country, and there-
fore defeats the very object of the grant. Congress does not make grants 
to aid in the construction of a road in portions of the country already well 
settled, nor does it authorize lands to be withdrawn from market and 
held in reservation or in trust to be given as a reward for the construc-
tion of a road after the country is well settled, for in thickly settled re-
gions railroads will be built without Government aid. 
We have already shown by authorities cited that when time of per-
formance is fixed in the instrument, or by statute, or is of the essence 
of the condition, or compensation for breach cannot be made-and all 
these elements are contained in this condition-it must be strictly per-
formed, whether it is a condition precedent or subsequent. 
(1. Broom and Hadley's Com., 602 (Waits's ed.), Note 277; 2. Redfield 
on Wills, 286, note; Taylor's Landlord and Tenant, p. 240, sec. 282; 
1. Bouvier's Institutes, 759, 760; Tyler on Ejectments, 179.) 
A forfeiture for breach of condition may be waived. But a waiver 
be implied by silence. (B. and M. R. R. Co. -os. Boestler, 15 Iowa, 
; Jackson va. Brock, 1 Johnson's Cases, 125; Lawrence vs. Gifford, 
Pick., 366; Pike vs. Butler, 4 N. Y., 360.) 
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Nor is a forfeiture waived by delay in enforcing it. (Gray vs. Blan-
chard, 8 Pick., 284; Pery vs. Davis, 3 C. B. (N. S.), 769; Doe vs. Allen, 
3 Taunt, 78; Calderwood vs. Brooks, 28 Cal., 15 J .) 
It must be remembered that the will or intent of Congress can never 
be implied from silence. It must always be ascertained from enact-
ments and resolutions. No waiver of forfeiture can be presumed by 
Congress, unle~s such waiver is made by statute or resolution, either 
expressly, or by fair implication from the provisions expressed. 
In construing public grants, all doubts which exist are to be resolved 
in favor of the Government and against the grantee. 
OBLIGATION OF THE GOVERNMENT IN REGARD TO INDIAN TITLE, 
It is asserted by the attorneys of the company that the Government 
obligated itself, by the granting act, to extinguish the Indian· title and 
survey the lands in the Indian Territory ; and they claim that both were 
indispensable to the complete utilization of the grant by its beneficiary. 
The realization of aid from the grants pledged by Congress to secure the 
construction of the road, and the possibility of reimbursement by profit. 
able carrying-trade in the operation of a constructed road, were neces-
sarily dependent upon the promised change in the legal conditions of 
the land titles along the prescribed route of the proposed road. They 
insist that the United States has not even attempted to fulfill its prom-
ise to extinguish the Indian titles. ,. 
All this is insisted upon with a pretended belief that it is based upon 
a fair construction of the granting act. The general route of the road, 
as prescribed by this act, runs from the west line of the State of Mis-
souri for three hundred and fifty miles through the Indian Territory, 
which was prior to said grant set apart by the Government for the ben-
efit of the Indians. The ultimate fee is vested in the United States, 
but which, by treaty stipulations, statutory enactments, and e.xecutive 
acts thereunder, have been set apart and reserved for the sole use and 
occupancy of certain Indian nations and tribes so long as their national 
or tribal organizations are preserved. The boundaries of this section of 
country are defined by various treaties with these nations and tribes, 
and by legislative acts which prescribe the limits of the contiguous 
States and Territories of the Union. The public-land system has never 
been extended over it. Congress has never taken any action to have it 
surveyed as public land. Much of it is held by four nations, the Choc-
taw, Chickasaw, Cherokee, and Creek, who have patents in accordance 
with treaties and laws, and all attempts to induce Congress to organ-
ize it into a Territory of the United States have, up to this time, failed. 
This is enough to show that the company bas no grant of land in this 
Territory, neither present norprospective, in our opinion. Nonewas in-
tended to be conferred by the act, except as such grant might be ac-
quired from the Indians by said company. Let us examine the grant-
ing act for a moment. 
The pretended claim of the company for the survey of the lands in 
this Territory is based upon the fourth and sixth sections of the act. 
If these sections stood alone and could be considered by themselves, or 
in connection with only the last clause of the second section; if there 
were no limitations to the grant as made by the third section, and if the 
seventeenth section was no part of the law, there might be some plausi-
bility in the claim that the fourth and sixth sections required that the 
lands be surveyed as fast as the road was completed. But if we con-
sider the law as a whole, as enacted, the claim is without foundation. 
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Under the third section the land to pass under the grant must be pub-
lic land, situated in a Territory or State, the title of which is in the 
United States, and which has not been sold or otherwise appropriated 
at the time the map of location of the route of its road is filed in the 
General Land Office. 
The lands in the Indian Territory are not public lands in the usual 
meaning of that term, and are not situated in a State or Territory of 
the United States. Certainly the United States so far as the lands 
within the boundaries of the Choctaw, Chickasaw, Cherokee, Creek, 
and Seminole Nations are concerned, does not possess full title to them; 
for they were, prior to the year 1866, the date of the granting act, set 
apart and reserved by the United States for the sole use and occupancy 
of various Indian nations and tribes. Therefore the claim that these 
lands were included in the grant under the third section cannot be 
maintained. 
Your committee is of the opinion, after a careful examination of the 
whole act, that no land was granted to the company in the Indian Ter-
ritory except such as might be acquired by the company from the Indian·s 
by virtue of the seventeenth section. This section authorized the com-
pany to accept any grant from an Indian tribe or nation through whose 
reservation its road might pass, subject to the approval of the President 
of the United States. This is the privilege conferred by the act, and 
we believe that the last clause of the second section only becomes 
applicable when this is done: 
And "the United States shall extinguish, as rapidly as may be consistent with pub-
lic policy and the welfare of the Indians, and only by their voluntary cession, the 
Indian title to all lands falling under the operation of this act and acquired in the 
donation to the road named in the act." 
The company at the beginning acted upon this construction of the 
law. This is fully shown by the files of the Interior Department. 
It asked permission of the Interior Department, and leave was granted, 
to open negotiations with some Qf the Indian tribes to effect a grant of 
lands, but was not successful in its efforts with the Indians. Thus the 
company by its acts admitted that there were no lands granted to it other 
than the right of way which was provided for in the treaties between 
the Government and the Indians. 
The company never set up any claim that it received any land by 
the grant in the Indian Territory until in the year 1877-eleven years 
after the act was passed. 
The Interior Department holds that· no lands were granted to this 
company in the Iudian Territory. This has been the uniform ruling of 
that Department on the subject. It was the ruling of the Hon. J. A. 
Williamson w bile he was Commissioner of the General Land Office, 
who is now attorney for the company. 
Your committee therefore finds that there is nothing in the claim of 
the attorneys of the company that the Government has failed in ex-
tinguishing the Indian titles and surveying the lands in the Indian 
Territory, as no grant of land was made to the company in said Terri-
tory. E~llf~ E ~·.~ . · 
We therefore, in view of the law and facts set forth in this report, 
recommend the passage of the accompanying bill as a substitute for 
all bills introduced in the House for the forfeiture of the land grant 
made to the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company. _..,.__ ;;;;... .... E .. 
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A BILL to forfeit the unearned lands granted to the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company " to aid 
in the construction of a railroad and telegraph line from the States of Missouri and Arkansas to 
the Pacific coast," and to restore the same to settlement, and for other purposes. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of Anterica 
in Congress asRentbled, That all the lands, excepting the right of way and lands for 
stations, heretofore granted to the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company by an act 
entitled "An act granting lands to aid in the construction of a railroad and telegraph 
line from the States of Missouri and Arkansas to the Pacific coast," approved July 
twenty-seventh, eighteen hundred and sixty-six, and subsequent acts and joint reso-
lutions of Congress, which are adjacent to and coterminous with the uncompleted 
poortions of the main line of said road, embraced within both the granted and indem-
nity limits, as contemplated to be constructed under and by the provisions of the said 
act of July twenty-seventh, eighteen hundred and sixty-six, and acts and joint reso-
lutions subsequent thereto and relating to the construction of said road and telegraph, 
be, and the same are hereby, declared forfeited and restored to the public domain, 
and made subject to disposal under the general laws of the United States, as though 
said grant had never been made: Provided, That the price of the lands so forfeited 
and restored shall be the same as heretofo.Ie fixed for the even-numbered section within 
said grant. 
SEc. 2. That the act of March third, eighteen hundred and seventy-five, entitled" An 
act for the relief of settlers within railroad limits," is hereby repealed. 
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